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Abstract
Punishment offers a powerful mechanism for the maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies, but the
maintenance of costly punishment itself remains problematic. Game theory has shown that corruption, where punishers can
defect without being punished themselves, may sustain cooperation. However, in many human societies and some insect
ones, high levels of cooperation coexist with low levels of corruption, and such societies show greater wellbeing than
societies with high corruption. Here we show that small payments from cooperators to punishers can destabilize corrupt
societies and lead to the spread of punishment without corruption (righteousness). Righteousness can prevail even in the
face of persistent power inequalities. The resultant righteous societies are highly stable and have higher wellbeing than
corrupt ones. This result may help to explain the persistence of costly punishing behavior, and indicates that corruption is
a sub-optimal tool for maintaining cooperation in human societies.
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Introduction
The role of punishment in maintaining cooperative societies has
attracted considerable attention from theorists [1–6], and their
findings may have far-reaching implications for the social sciences.
Punishment – inflicting harm on individuals who fail to cooperate
[5,6] – is thought to facilitate cooperation within societies as diverse
as those of humans [7–9], chimpanzees [10] and insects [11].
However, the evolutionary maintenance of punishment itself
presents a problem [5]. Punishment is likely to be costly to
punishers: it requires effort, and risks provoking retaliation.
Therefore, punishers are likely to be removed by natural selection
[5]. In human societies, where cultural evolution is prominent,
individuals may also learn to avoid punishing others because of
these costs [12,13].
Models suggest that costly punishment can be maintained if
punishers may defect [14–16], a scenario termed corruption [17].
Such corruption has been documented among social wasps [17,18]
and ants [19]. Eldakar and Wilson [16] note that defectors have an
incentive to punish because doing so increases the proportion of
cooperators available to exploit. Allowing punishers to defect can
effectively create a division of labor between punishers and
cooperative non-punishers, maintaining cooperation in the society
as a whole.
In many realistic scenarios, there may be power inequalities
between punishers and non-punishers. For example, U ´beda and
Due ´n ˜ez-Guzma ´n [20] explored the effects of allowing punishers to
defect with reduced punishment. They termed this scenario the
‘‘corruption game’’. The results showed that when power inequal-
ities were small, defecting punishers could help to maintain
a cooperative non-punishing population. The model might apply,
for example, to the social wasp Dolichovespula sylvestris, where
punishing behavior appears to be largely confined to defectors and
queens [17]. However, in other insect societies, punishment
appears to be widespread while defectors are rare, a scenario that
we will call righteousness. For example, Kawabata and Tsuji [21]
introduced individuals with developed ovaries to pre-existing
colonies of the queenless Japanese Diacamma sp. ants. They found
that such individuals were aggressively attacked by ants with
inactive ovaries. Ants are thought to lack the cognitive resources
for reputation systems, so the existence of righteousness in these
groups presents a puzzle.
U ´beda and Due ´n ˜ez-Guzma ´n [20], found that corruption could
sometimes increase the net wellbeing of the population (that is, the
cumulative payoff of individuals). This occurred because defecting
punishers could maintain cooperation in a non-punishing sub-
population that would otherwise defect. U ´beda and Due ´n ˜ez-
Guzma ´n [20] argued that this result provides insight into human
psychology, noting that corruption is widespread in many human
societies and that individuals increase their moralizing (but not
moral behavior) when their power increases [22]. Furthermore,
the authors concluded that economic policy may ‘‘use corruption
to the advantage of a society’’, arguing that ‘‘the punishment
inflicted on [punishers] should always be lower than the
punishment inflicted on [non-punishers]’’ in order to maintain
cooperation.
Corruption in human societies carries large and well-documen-
ted costs to many aspects of individual and societal wellbeing. Such
costs can be measured in terms of social capital [23,24], happiness
and life satisfaction [25,26], economic development [27–31] and
health [32,33]. Given these costs, it is important to establish
whether facilitating corruption via power inequalities is indeed
a useful tool for maintaining cooperation in human societies.
Empirical evidence provides little support for the idea that
corruption assists human cooperation [31]. Inequality does indeed
correlate positively with corruption [30]. However, inequality and
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related to trust [26]. Numerous studies have argued that
corruption weakens social networks [23], as well as decreasing
investment [27] and sustainable development [31].
Overall, this evidence suggests that corruption undermines both
cooperation and wellbeing in human societies. This observation
conflicts with the prediction of the corruption game, that co-
operation and wellbeing should be greater in societies that permit
corruption. In addition, the model does not explain the existence of
apparently righteous social insects [21]. It seems the corruption
game fails to capture some relevant aspects of punishment.
U ´beda and Due ´n ˜ez-Guzma ´n [20] identified globally stable
equilibria where the population consisted of a mixture of
punishing and non-punishing cooperators. The authors argued
that these equilibria were structurally unstable: that is, a small
perturbation to the game payoffs could destroy them, and push the
population to a different equilibrium. Such perturbations are likely
to occur by chance in natural populations. A crucial question,
then, is what would be the long-term outcome of such
perturbations?
At least one such perturbation appears to be a general feature of
human psychology. Costly punishment is used to express negative
emotion [34]. Expressions of anger result in increased social status
and perceived competency [35], and aggression enhances
perceived popularity and social centrality [36]. Anger especially
enhances status when it is perceived as retaliatory [37,38]; in this
situation, observers often respond uncritically to hostile action
[39,40] and may even assist punishers [41]. In humans, social
status is strongly related to several forms of wellbeing, including
health [42], happiness [43], absence of psychological distress [44],
and income [45], as well as evolutionary fitness [46]. The
increased status of individuals who express anger at injustice can
therefore be interpreted as a small payment to punishers.
More generally, the tendency to punish may have social
consequences for the punisher beyond the immediate cost of
punishment. Such consequences might be negative or positive. In
the original corruption game, corruption stabilized cooperation by
effectively offsetting the cost of punishment. There are, however,
other ways in which this cost might be offset. A small benefit to
punishers in interactions with cooperators, such as the status-
payments described, could provide an alternative means to offset
the cost of punishment. Here, we explore how such small benefits
to punishers affect the maintenance of cooperation and the
evolution of corruption and righteousness. Importantly, these
payments avoid most components of a reputation system, where
individuals decide whom to cooperate with based on information
about past interactions received from others [47–49]. Such
reputation systems require cognitive and social resources that
may be unavailable in some systems. Cooperators in our model
automatically make small payments to punishers. For this to work,
punishers need only be physically recognizable by cooperators or
by a centralized authority. This is biologically plausible for social
insects, where punishers are often larger and stronger [18,19,50].
In human societies, punishers can often be identified by cultural
tags such as uniforms even in the absence of individual
recognition, and payments can also be conferred via taxation
systems without any need for individual observation.
Methods
We consider an evolutionary game with four strategies, namely:
cooperative non-punisher (C), defecting non-punisher (D), co-
operative punisher (H) and defecting punisher (K). The game is
defined by the payoff matrix
A~
CDHK
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K
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where each row corresponds to the four strategies in the above
order. For conciseness, we will refer to the strategies as cooperator
(C), defector (D), cooperative punisher (H), and defecting punisher
(K). Throughout this article, we use bold letters to represent non-
scalar variables with upper- and lower-case letters corresponding
to matrices and vectors, respectively.
Parameters r,s,tw0 correspond to the payoffs of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma where twr. Traditionally, r stands for the reward of
cooperation, t for the temptation of defection, and s for the sucker’s
payoff. For simplicity we assume that t{r{sw0. Parameters
p,qw0 correspond to the cost experienced by a defecting non-
punisher (p) and a defecting punisher (q) when punished.
Parameter cw0 corresponds to the cost experienced by a punisher
when punishing another individual. To account for payments from
cooperators to punishers, we introduce the parameter ew0. For
simplicity, we will assume that e is very small, (in particular e%c).
Although payment e is made by non-punishers at an individual
level during interactions, it is dynamically equivalent to a payment
by all non-punishers.
Notice that in the absolute absence of defectors (or defecting
punishers), cooperators have a smaller payoff than honest
punishers which ‘‘solves’’ the problem of second-order free-riding.
However, in the presence of even a small amount of defection
(which is very biologically and socially realistic), punishers have
a smaller payoff than pure cooperators. This is due to the fact that
payments are very small (0ve%c) when compared to the costs of
punishing.
There are two differences between our payoff matrix (A) and the
payoff matrix of the Corruption Game [20]: introduction of
parameter e, and collapsing the costs of inflicting a punishment on
defectors (c) and on defecting punishers (d) into one parameter (c).
The choice to collapse c and d is to maintain tractability of the
model by maintaining the same number of parameters. Moreover,
the existence and stability of all equilibria in the Corruption Game
was independent from c [20]. Although c had a quantitative effect
on the size of basins of attraction, parameter d was also free in the
sense that the relevant dynamics involved qzd, and never d
alone. Notice that in the special case when the cost of punishing is
equal for both types of punishers (c~d) the Corruption Game
corresponds to e~0.
The game reduced to only C and H has a degenerate payoff
matrix in the Corruption Game, that is, both strategies have
exactly the same payoff r. As a consequence, all equilibria
consisting of cooperators and/or cooperative punishers are
structurally unstable and were not analyzed by U ´beda and
Due ´n ˜ez-Guzma ´n [20]. In the current model, however, the game
reduced to the strategies C and H has a non-degenerate payoff
matrix
CH
C
H
rr {e
rzer
  
ð1Þ
thus avoiding the existence of structurally unstable equilibria.
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simplicity and because it is zero-sum. Other perturbations can lead
to qualitatively different dynamics, but require a significant surplus
of payoffs (or costs), which is harder to justify biologically. For
humans, ew0 could result from increased social status of
punishers; for other species, the value of e could be either positive
or negative. When ev0, righteousness is globally unstable, and the
dynamics lead to either defection or corruption, which is
qualitatively equivalent to the Corruption Game. Thus, ew0 is
the only situation which may lead to righteousness.
Both cultural and genetic evolution are most commonly studied
using replicator dynamics [51–53]. Like U ´beda and Due ´n ˜ez-Guzma ´n
[20], we analyze the model through the continuous time replicator
dynamics equation:
_ x xi~xi((Ax)i{xTAx) ð2Þ
where xi corresponds to the frequency of a strategy in the
population, and subscript i corresponds to each of the four
strategies available fC,D,H,Kg. _ x xi corresponds to the time
derivative, and xT denotes the transpose of the column vector x.
Note that we are representing the frequencies of strategies in the
population by a vector x of dimension 4. Therefore, we can
geometrically consider all possible population states as elements of
the 3-simplex. Populations consisting of only one strategy would lie
at vertices of this tetrahedron (see Figure 1).
Results
The equilibria of Equation (2) may rest at discrete points in the
interior, corners, edges, or faces of the simplex formed by all
possible population states. When an equilibrium is stable, it is
locally asymptotically stable. We will refer to equilibria by z with
subindices denoting where the equilibrium lies. For instance, zC
will correspond to the equilibrium at the vertex C, and zCDK to an
internal equilibrium in the face comprised by the strategies C, D
and K. Note that this is a slight deviation from U ´beda and
Due ´n ˜ez-Guzma ´n [20] in which a different notation was used for
equilibria at vertices, edges and faces of the simplex.
A monomorphic population of defectors (zD) is always stable. As
is customary, we will call this equilibrium defection. In addition to
this equilibrium, two other stable equilibria can exist. One is either
zK or zCK (i.e. a population comprised of defecting punishers or
defecting punishers and cooperators), which we will refer to as
corruption, and either zH or zHK (i.e. a population comprised of
cooperative punishers, perhaps with defecting punishers at low
frequency) which we will refer to as righteousness (see Appendix).
Figure 2 shows the conditions for stability of the three main
equilibria (defection, corruption and righteousness) depending on
the severity of the punishment towards defectors and corrupt
punishers (parameters p and q, respectively). The total cost of
punishing a corrupt punisher (qzc) determines the stability of the
corruption equilibrium. Corruption is stable whenever
pwqzc ð3Þ
either at zK if qzcvsze or at zCK if qzcwsze, recalling that s
is the sucker’s payoff of cooperators against defectors, and e is the
payment of cooperators to punishers. The overall temptation to
defect (t{r, that is, the difference between the payoff of a defector
and a cooperator against a cooperator) mediates the stability of the
righteousness equilibrium. Righteousness is stable whenever
pwt{r and qwf ð4Þ
that is, when the punishments for defection are severe enough to
both defectors and corrupt punishers. Righteousness is stable
either at zH if qwt{r or at zHK if fvqvt{r; where
f~max p{c
t{r{p
t{r{s{c,
c(t{r)zes
cze
no
depends on p (see Text S1,
equation S9), and is denoted by the two-segment line bounding the
narrow region under q~t{r in Figure 2.
Note that the regions of stability for righteousness and
corruption overlap all through the region delimited by pwqzc
and qwt{r, as well as through most of the narrow region where
zHK is stable (see Text S1). Intuitively, righteousness and
corruption are both stable when punishment p against non-
punishers is larger than the total cost qzc of punishing a punisher,
and when the punishment q against corrupt punishers is severe (i.e.
larger than the overall temptation to defect t{r). Recall that
pwqzc denotes a power inequality in favor of defecting
punishers, and q&p indicates a case of egalitarian punishments.
Basins of Attraction: Simulations
To estimate the basin of attraction of each of the equilibria, we
simulated the dynamics of the system numerically. All runs were
performed with t~4, r~2, s~1, c~0:2 and e~0:01.
We conduct the analysis for the punishment parameters p and
q with values between 1 and 10 in increments of 0:25. Given
a value of the parameters p and q, we analyze the dynamics
Figure 1. Conditions for stability of the four corners of the
simplex. If the condition is satisfied, then the direction pointed by the
arrow behaves as a local attractor. zD is always stable, denoted by the
filled circle, while zC is always unstable, denoted by the open circle.
While many equilibria at the edges of the simplex may be stable in the
reduced games, we reserve filled circles to indicate globally stable
equilibria (i.e. equilibria that are stable in the full game with the four
strategies.).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044432.g001
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zD is not analyzed for it is always stable. For each of these three
cases, we take a set of small perturbations (of order 0:01)
uniformly around the corresponding corner, and simulate the
dynamical system using an Euler scheme until the population is
close enough to one of the three main equilibria: defection,
corruption or righteousness.
We summarize the proportion of runs that end in each of the
three possible equilibria (see Figure 3). These proportions are
a numerical approximation of the equilibrium’s basin of attraction
as a function of p and q.
As expected, whenever power inequalities favor non-punishers
(qzcwp, and thus corruption is unstable), the proportion of runs
converging to corruption is zero (see Figure 2). In general, as long
as qzcws, increasing power asymmetries (by increasing p or
decreasing qzc) increases the basin of attraction of corruption.
This is seen in Figure 3, where the basin of attraction of corruption
increases from zero when p~qzc to close to one when p&qzc.
It is worth noting that when the population starts at
righteousness, and both qwt{r and pwt{r, then the dynamics
always remain at righteousness. Moreover, even when the
population starts close to zK,u pt o80% of the runs end up in
righteousness (Figure 3). This proportion grows as both p and q
grow and is maximal whenever p&q, that is, when there are no
power inequalities. This pattern is maintained even when the cost
to punish c is much larger (data not shown).
Discussion
We have explored the effect of a perturbation to the corruption
game, namely, small payments (such as a slight increase in social
status) to punishers. We find that the more egalitarian and harsher
the punishments toward defectors and defecting punishers, the
more likely the population will maintain cooperation through
punishment and keep both corruption and defection at bay. In this
scenario, the most likely outcome is a monomorphic population of
cooperative punishers (righteousness). This shows not only that
costly punishment can evolve (recall that e%c), but that even when
the social investment in punishment (a payment of e from non-
punishing cooperators to punishers) diminishes as non-punishers
shrink in frequency, punishing still pays off better than defecting.
Moreover, the prevalence of cooperative punishers makes de-
fection by punishers an inviable strategy, even when defecting
punishers get more lenient punishments (power inequality). Thus,
a righteous population can effectively resist the spread of
corruption.
Figure 2. Stability of the three main equilibria on the system as a function of parameters p and q. The white area corresponds to the
cases in which defection is the only globally stable equilibrium. Notice that there is an area where righteousness and corruption intersect, in this
region, all three main equilibria are stable. Depicted are representative cases for each of the four areas. While the position of the main equilibria
might change and existence of other (unstable) internal equilibria in some edges might exist for specific parameter combinations, the qualitative
dynamics are captured by these depicted cases. For simplicity, internal equilibria in the faces of the simplex are not drawn. All internal equilibria in
the faces are unstable (see Appendix).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044432.g002
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payoff to cooperative groups, constitutes a mechanism to shift the
scale of selection from an individual to a group level. Unlike
alternative mechanisms to maintain cooperation, such as reputa-
tion, righteousness requires no individual recognition or memory.
Righteousness does require some ability to discriminate between
punishers and non-punishers, but such discrimination can occur
without complex cognition; for example, ant punishers are often
larger and more aggressive than non-punishers [18,19,50].
Because the collective payoff of righteousness is higher than that
of alternative outcomes, righteous groups are likely to outcompete
those that have converged on defection or corruption. As a result,
righteousness is expected to spread either culturally or genetically.
This mechanism may explain the observation of righteous
punishment in some ant species [21] and some human societies
[54].
The Path to Righteousness
Naı ¨ve cooperation is commonly taken as a starting point for
studying the evolution of strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
related games [2]. Our results show that a population that starts at
or close to all cooperation will either go to defection or corruption,
but not to righteousness (Figure 3, top). However, if it goes to
corruption, it is possible to destabilize this equilibrium and have
the population end up at righteousness in a reliable manner
(Figure 3, middle and bottom). Much of the dynamics revolve
around the costs imposed by corruption (qzc) and the appeal of
defection (t{r).
An initially cooperating population that faces invasion by
defectors might institute punishment in response. Even mild
punishment (qvs, pvt{r) can suppress defection. However, the
punishers in this population are susceptible to corruption. In fact,
power inequalities that favor corruption (qzcvp) are required to
keep defectors at bay, and if costs are small, corruption runs
rampant (qzcvs).
Now that the population is corrupt, it is in a stable situation.
Small changes to the costs and punishments will not change the
dynamics qualitatively. While cooperation can be increased by
increasing the cost of corruption, there will always be defecting
punishers, and in fact they are needed to prevent defection
spreading [20]. However, if cooperators invest even a tiny amount
in punishment (ew0), there is a possible route from corruption to
righteousness. Conferring increased status on punishers, as occurs
among humans, may be one form of such investment.
Corruption can be destabilized by making punishments both
more egalitarian (p&q) and harsher (pwt{r and q close to or
above t{r, see inequality 4). Provided punishments are sufficiently
harsh, completely removing power inequalities (p~q) eliminates
corruption, and cooperative punishment will likely spread.
However, complete equality is likely to be unfeasible in human
societies. Given that power inequalities cannot be removed
completely, a sudden, large change in punishment can still
destabilize corruption and stimulate a transition to righteousness.
The righteous population is resilient to invasion by both
corruption and defection. In fact, righteousness is so stable that
once there, a population needs to drop at least one of the
punishments q or p below t{r (making defection appealing once
again) in order for a perturbation to destabilize it (see Figure 3,
bottom). Power inequalities are largely irrelevant to the righteous
population; reducing power inequalities is only required initially to
destabilize corruption, and lead the dynamics toward righteous-
ness instead of defection.
Mandatory payments from cooperators to punishers are justified
empirically as discussed at the end of the introduction. However,
we can conceive of a scenario in which there exist cooperators that
do not make payments to punishers. In this case, we would have
a line of neutral stability between the two types of cooperators as
well between non-paying cooperators and honest punishers.
Figure 3. Dynamics of the system in the vicinity of zC (top), zK
(middle) and zH (bottom). The horizontal axis corresponds to the
value of p. The vertical axis corresponds to the value of q. Isoclines
represent the proportion of runs converging to corruption (red) and
righteousness (blue). All runs that do not converge to either corruption
or righteousness end up in defection (white).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044432.g003
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existence or stability of the righteousness equilibrium in the
replicator equation. However, in the presence of noisy dynamics,
righteousness could be lost due to drift (confirmed via numerical
simulation; data not shown). This loss of righteousness is similar to
the way tit-for-tat, which is an attractor and a promoter of
cooperation in the presence of defection, is lost in noisy dynamics
due to the neutral stability with pure cooperators [55]. Intuitively,
righteousness is typically capable of eradicating defection from
a population, which allows for non-paying cooperators to spread
due to drift. Later, if no paying cooperators remain, the dynamics
are governed by the original Corruption Game, and righteousness
is lost.
Nonetheless, notice that the interpretation of the payment e is
flexible. For instance, assuming that pure cooperators have a small
chance of giving a gift to a punisher instead of being it mandatory
does not change the dynamics. In this way, e can be interpreted as
the expected payment over many interactions.
Consequences for Human Societies
Our results may help to explain the paradoxical data observed
in human societies. U ´beda and Due ´n ˜ez-Guzma ´n [20] suggested
that if human cooperation is reliant on punishment, corruption
should be universal among enforcers, negatively related to
defection, and positively related to societal wellbeing. In reality,
however, the extent of corruption varies markedly between
societies and is negatively correlated with several aspects of
economic development [27–29,31] social wellbeing [23–26,30]
and cooperation [30]. Crime in general can be considered as
defection, but corruption is positively related to other forms of
crime [30].
In addition, whereas U ´beda and Due ´n ˜ez-Guzma ´n [20] predict
societies consisting of non-punishing cooperators governed by
a corrupt minority, results from public goods games suggest that in
some human societies, everybody punishes and most people
cooperate [54]. Field studies of an egalitarian nomadic prestate
society, the Turkana, also show that power inequalities are not
required for the maintenance of large-scale cooperation via
collective punishment of free-riders [56].
One possible explanation for the observed variance and
negative impact of corruption is that some societies have
transitioned, or are transitioning, from widespread corruption to
righteousness (the reverse transition being much more difficult, as
described above). Democratization and improved law enforcement
may tend to reduce the power inequalities that favor corruption;
such change may occur suddenly, facilitating the transition to
righteousness, due to new policies or change of government.
Because the total societal payoff of righteousness exceeds that of
corruption, groups that have attained righteousness are likely to
out-compete those that remain corrupt. For example, Mathew and
Boyd [56] suggest that the cooperation generated by collective
punishment may explain the dominance of the Turkana over
competing groups.
For tractability, game theory models necessarily consider
a restricted set of possible strategies. In contrast, humans may
use an endless variety of strategies, including maladaptive ones
such as antisocial punishment [14,57]. More complex models,
such as simulations incorporating more detailed social dynamics
and complex strategies, can help to bridge the gap between
analytical prediction and empirical reality. In this context, the
current model suggests possible lines of research that could lead to
significant policy reform.
Corruption is a major social problem, and its reduction is an
active area of research. Our results suggest that social policy can
stimulate such a transition by enforcing strong, egalitarian
punishments. They also imply that without such policy change,
corruption will remain ubiquitous. Intuitively, in trying to promote
righteousness, it might seem appealing to punish corruption much
more harshly than other forms of defection (qwp). However, this
does not maximize the chance of righteousness. Thus, in fighting
corruption, a society should not yield to the temptation to
overshoot power asymmetries from tolerating corruption
(p&qzc) to severe reprisals against corruption (p%q). In other
words, the path to righteousness starts with fairness, not with
vengeance.
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